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In a long-anticipated judgment at the International Criminal Court (ICC), Trial
Chamber IX found Dominic Ongwen, a former commander in the Lord Resistance
Army (LRA), guilty of 61 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in Northern Uganda, including 19 counts of sexual and gender-based
crimes (SGBC). Unlike earlier cases at the ICC in situations where SGBC was
prevalent, the charges went beyond rape and other forms of sexual violence to
include charges tried at the ICC for the first time, namely forced marriage as an
inhumane act and forced pregnancy.
This commentary will reflect on the significance and shortcomings of the Ongwen
case from the perspective of developing jurisprudence on forced marriage and
forced pregnancy at the ICC and beyond.
Recognising the gendered, non-sexual dimensions of forced marriage (Counts
50 and 61)
As forced marriage is not an explicitly recognised crime in the Rome Statute, its
legal characterisation is at the discretion of the Prosecutor (OTP), and ultimately,
the Chambers. Earlier – yet limited – litigation of this crime, first at the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kantl and Prosecutor v. Sesay,
Kallon and Gbai) and later at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia
(Prosecutor v. Nuon and Khieu, Case 002/02) laid an important foundation in
asserting that forced marriage is not exclusively a sexual crime and therefore, not to
be equated with the crime of sexual slavery.
In the present case, Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen, the Prosecutor brought – for the
first time – explicit charges of forced marriage as an inhumane act pursuant to Article
7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute. Thereby, the Prosecutor put the legalcharacterisation
of this crime again in the spotlight. For one, this was significant considering that the
ICC OTP’s 2014 Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes is silent on this
crime, which could be taken as a sign that the OTP considers forced marriage to
be captured in the crime of sexual slavery.Additionally, in Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, acts involving forced marriage were only
charged and confirmed as sexual slavery (paras. 431, 434-435). As such, the explicit
forced marriage charges brought in the Ongwen case represented a move away
from the limited consideration of forced marriage, and an opportunity to explore its
gendered dimensions.
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On multiple occasions, starting from the confirmation phase, Ongwen’s defence
submitted that forced marriage is not a crime in the Rome Statute, and that it
should not be charged as an inhumane act but be subsumed in the charge of
sexual slavery, as has previously been done at Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga
and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (paras. 128-130). The Ongwen pre-trial Chamber,
however, confirmed the Prosecutor’s position that forced marriage differs from
sexual slavery “in terms of conduct, ensuing harm, and protected interests” (para.
92). The Chamber recognised that forced marriage will generally be committed in
situations where victims are enslaved by the perpetrator, including sexually. Its key
feature, however, is the imposition of ‘marriage’ on the victims, the duties associated
with it, and the status of being the perpetrator’s “wife” (paras. 91-95).
The Ongwen Trial Chamber elaborated in its judgment that while forced marriage
implies the imposition of a conjugal association, it “does not necessarily require
the exercise of ownership over a person, an essential element for the existence of
the crime of enslavement” (para. 2750). The Chamber additionally noted that the
imposition of a marital status on a victim is not captured in the crime of rape either,
and that this specific status results in victims’ suffering of “trauma and stigma beyond
that caused by being a rape victim alone” (ibid).
While the Chamber underscored the social, ethnic and religious effects of forced
marriage and its serious impact on victims (para. 2748), it left the gendered harm
and impact unexplored and therefore, unrecognised. This represents a missed
opportunity considering the intersecting grounds that underpin the commission of this
crime, particularly gender grounds, and link it to other crimes that were committee
concurrently.
Looking beyond sexual violence perpetrated parallel to or consequential of forced
marriage helps in furthering the understanding of the gendered nature of this crime,
particularly when intersecting with religious and ethnic dimensions. For instance,
in situations such as Syria and Iraq, enslavement, sexual slavery and forced
marriage against females of religious minorities have been instrumentalised by
armed groups with extreme ideologies as a tool for gender and religious persecution,
both manifesting in forced marriage. There, forced marriage was both a tool for
operationalising conversion in religion, where a consequence of such conversion
is marriage compatibility, and for persecuting women based on their gender and
treating them as inferior to men. The combination of crimes committed against
both females and males is an attack against their religious and group identity, in an
inherently gendered manner.
Navigating a narrow definition: The first consideration of forced pregnancy at
the ICC (Counts 58 and 59)
The Ongwen Trial Chamber pioneered international criminal jurisprudence by
convicting a defendant, for the first time, of the crime of forced pregnancy as both a
crime against humanity and a war crime, pursuant to Article 7 (1)(g) and Article 8 (2)
(vi) Rome Statute, respectively.
- 2 -
The crime of forced pregnancy requires not only the two material elements of
confinement and forcible impregnation; but also the mens rea requirement that
the perpetrator have committed the crime with the intent to confine the woman
forcibly made pregnant as well as the specific intent of either “affecting the ethnic
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international
law” (Article 7 (2)(f) Rome Statute, Element 1 of Article 7(1)(g)-4 EoC).
The Rome Statute appears to additionally require that the perpetrator have
committed the crime with the intent to keep the woman pregnant. With reference
to the drafting history and related discussions (para. 2728), the Ongwen Trial
Chamber takes the opposite stance. It clarifies that “the crime of forced pregnancy
consists in the confinement of a forcibly pregnant woman in order to carry out other
grave violations of international law, regardless of whether the accused specifically
intended to keep the woman pregnant” (para. 2729). The Chamber also asserts
that the effects of the women’s confinement is the deprivation of their reproductive
autonomy (para. 2722).
In its assessment of the material element, the Ongwen Trial Chamber held that the
confinement of the two forcibly pregnant women was due to their placement under
heavy guard and their understanding that they would be killed if they tried to escape
(para. 3058). While the mens rea element was met as a result of the nature and
sustained character of the acts by Ongwen over a long period of time (para. 3060),
the specific intent was reflected in the fact that the women had been forcibly made
pregnant by Ongwen “with the intent of sustaining the continued commission of
other crimes” against them, especially crimes that are part of the identified pattern
of sexual violence, namely forced marriage, torture, rape and sexual slavery (para.
3061).
The narrow definition of the crime of forced pregnancy has its origins in the
patriarchal oppression countering reproductive justice demands in the late 90s, and
sadly, still today. It is a reflection of the patriarchal fear and consequential backlash
that criminalising forced pregnancy may be understood as interfering with respective
national laws criminalizing abortions. The political nature of the high threshold of this
crime is rooted in its drafting history and related discussions, as was duly noted by
the Ongwen Trial Chamber (para. 2728).
The commitment to account for the two counts of forced pregnancy should be
applauded. Yet, the case fails to expressly explore the nexus between forced
pregnancy and other crimes that were committed concurrently, including forced
marriage and sexual slavery, by failing to acknowledge the gender ground that is
common to their commission.
Conclusion
The Ongwen Trial Chamber’s judgment was handed down at the backdrop of a
decade’s long absence of effective accountability for survivors of gender-based
crimes, including sexual violence. It enhances jurisprudence on gender-based
crimes by examining previously uncharged crimes in combination with previously
charged sexual crimes through a prism glass. Yet, the prism glass has not been
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used to its full potential since the gender stereotypes and gender hierarchies that
motivated the commission of these crimes, as well as their socioeconomic impact on
women and girls, have been left unexplored.
The OTP’s prosecution team in the Ongwen case has taken a long stride for the
Court in finally addressing previously overlooked sexual and gender-based crimes
against the common, unfortunate myth that they would be ‘too hard’ to prove. Yet,
a noticeable gap in the OTP’s case is the absence of the charge of persecution
on gender grounds as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 7(1)(h) Rome
Statute. Charging the conduct of forced marriage, forced pregnancy and sexual
slavery accumulatively with gender-based persecution would have cast profound
recognition on the discriminatory intent towards women on the basis of their gender.
That intent underpinned the LRA’s treatment of and crimes against women and girls.
The absence of the charge of gender-based persecution in the Ongwen case is
part of a broader challenge to recognise and prosecute this crime. No suspect has
faced this charge until 2019, when the OTP included persecution on gender grounds
among the charges against Al-Hassan. Al-Hassan’s case, and other preliminary
examinations and investigations where persecution on gender grounds is gaining
recognition, all offer a long overdue examination of the gender grounds that lead
to the targeting of women and girls, as well as men and boys, in the commission of
crimes.
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